

Physics ≈ science of what all things in the natural world have in common

forces

the physical: its domain

Physicalism ≈ all concrete objects and phenomena lie within the physical domain; differences between things are due to differences in arrangement and interactions of physical stuff.

Properties *reduce to* others: being water just is being H₂O and its being H₂O allows us to *explain* (observable) properties of water.

More abstract (higher-order) properties are realized in less abstract ones: being a cell can be realized in multiple (different) ways.

Physicalism (refined) := all properties of concrete things are **fundamental** physical properties, reducible to or realized in them.

Sounds plausible... but also for consciousness

and intentionality



Spoiler: won't satisfy.



subjectivity yields epistemic asymmetries

First-personal knowledge of own mind, knowledge of other minds only inferential.

can doubt the existence of much, but not that I exist (what doesn't exist can't be deceived).

Dualism: "Alors, certainement, j'existe comme une chose pensante, et le corps est une chose étendue et différente!" [Surely, I exist as a thinking thing and the body is an extended and different thing!]

But pray tell, how do they interact, Descartes (given that you think the body is a kind of mechanism)?

Subjects are individuated by the way it is like to be them, their perspective & viewpoint.

Experiencing oneself as existing does **not** seem **reducible** to being individuated physically, i.e., as spatiotemporally located.

Identity theorists can explain such differences, but neither qualitativeness itself nor specific correlations with physical states.

Subjective experiences have a *qualitative* character (how red / green look, how things smell, feel, etc. differs).


Surely, all-knowing color-physicist Mary (brought up in a black and white environment) learns something new when for the first time she sees red... but what? A non-physical fact?



How to fill this explanatory gap? We have no clue!

Btw., identity theorists also rule out that Superman or octopuses

feel like we do.



us to show that Davidson's

irreducibility claim is wrong.

Many thoughts are about (even impossible / non-existing) things, physical stuff at best indicates existing things.

Mark of the mental: it can be about things.

Remember, there is also a problem with intentionality!

If the language is realized as neuronal firings, these can cause behavior and encode rational relations.

Successful computational models suggest that in humans, too, we should presuppose a language of thought

...physical vary with mental states...

good part: computation doesn't give us meaning, only syntax.

can be specified without reference to mental vocabulary...

mentality is functional (realizable in Superman, too!); bad part: the idea that its function

Here is an idea, behaviorism: attributions of mental states are covert subjunctive conditional claims about the behavior we expect people to exhibit in various circumstances.



Too many items could realize such complex functional states, which then won't, intuitively, have the kind of subjectivity we're after.

Probably best bet for the physicalist, if it wasn't for Ned Block's point...


Functionalists say (against Jackson): Mary doesn't learn anything, she enters a functional state that she knew about, but hadn't yet been in.

Well, we scientific functionalists take the mind to be realized like software on neurological hardware (empirical research matters).

> Try analytical functionalism: abstract from the complex network of mental terms all in one go, while (against Ryle) remaining ontologically committed to mental states.







Come

again!?!?