

am a *physicalist*, not a dualist. Why? Because pting for dualism doesn't provide any help with the problems physicalists face

1) specify dualism & physicalism 2) suggest that standard arguments against Not all facts are physical, some facts about phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained in physical terms

Dualist:

Substance dualists posit the existence of a non-physical substance (mind, soul, etc.)

**Property dualists** think that there are two



I focus on the more popular view: property dualism (PD). physicalism

Answer: various arguments against

Claim (2):

That this is a bad argument can be seen by realizing that the following argument

has the exact same structure and is clearly bad.

P1: I, Mary Jane, can imagine that Spiderman is actually Spiderman.

P2: I, Mary Jane, cannot imagine that Spiderman is actually Peter Parker.

P3: For any two items, if I can imagine different things of them, they cannot be the

leaving her black-and-white room for the first time to see red, does she gain new knowledge?

Conceivability argument: zombies are conceivable, i.e., creatures like us without phenomenal consciousness

Side remark: They must solve the hard problem of consciousness nonphysicalistically.

David Chalmers

What dualists must explain:

My strategy: Specify what dualists must explain & then show that they can't.

Appeal to non-

Dualist: No, consciousness is \_\_

different!

Dualist: Why believe that

physics is causally closed?

physical entities is necessary. Dockham's razor: Don't refer to more entities in explanations than necessary.

Property dualists think that physical & non-physical properties are importantly but

Optimistic meta-induction: Science has always succeeded without

postulating irreducible mental entities. Same for consciousness!

Causal exclusion: How could distinct mental entities have causal power visà-vis the causally closed real of the physical?

General: explanatory gap! How to explain mental stuff in physical terms? We have no idea!

True, these problems are



Yes! We need an extra ingredient that only dualists can offer; a small set of simple. general, irreducible psychophysical laws / bridging principles that explain how consciousness arises from physical processes

I will give you two arguments that there isn't anything helpful to find here!



**Bonus material** 

Why there must be two different substances: P1: I can imagine that I have no body.

P2: I cannot imagine that I have no mind. P3: For any two items, if I can imagine different things of them, they cannot be the same

C: Mind and body cannot be the same.

awkward. Is dualism really so bad, then?



Methodological argument:

Arguably, dualists like Chalmers think that all we need to do is engage in more empirical research. They think (or rather: bet) a priori (i.e., on nonempirical grounds) that such research must yield consciousness and some psychophysical laws as basic.

Tension: If their reasons for thinking that there cannot be any physicalist solution for explaining consciousness is a priori (i.e., non-empirical), why do they still believe that ultimately, science will (or can) settle the issue?

Assuming the methodological problem question what dualism should look like



assume that all is **some small set** of properties tha

Structure of my 2nd argument: On the assumption

that dualists must appeal to protophenomenal properties that are neither exactly physical nor phenomenal, there are two wavs in which dualists could proceed. Both fail!

These would likely be some unfamiliar, fundamental phenomenal or quasi-phenomenal properties. Let's call them phenomenal minima or proto-

phenomenal properties.

Preliminary point:

Why bridge-principle protophenomenalism

doesn't work:

properties via some *new fundamental laws* 

P2: PPP either have or lack the marks of the

P3: If they lack them, they look very much

P4: If they have them, face the problem how

C: Either way, the hard problem of

consciousness rearises

Now we have two

options:

a) bridge-principle

protophenomenalism

b) Russellian monism

mental phenomenality

The marks of the mental

Descartes

1) There is something it is like to have the property (like seeing red). 2) Such properties are introspectable to


those who have them. 3) Introspective access is incorrigible (we can be wrong about how things are, but not about how things seem to us).

Introduce PPP to explain phenomenal properties (PP). Introduce PPPP to introduce PPP, PPPPP to explain PPPP, etc

Side remark: As you see, there are links between our topic & e.g., philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, & philosophy

of mind.

The problem here is P3: It is false. Generally, certain verbs, such as 'imagine', believe', 'think', 'doubt', 'wonder', etc. open what is called intensional contexts. And substituting co-referring terms into such contexts does not guarantee that one gets a true sentence, even if the original sentence was true.



**Potential regress:** 

Note: Russellian Monists must assume that PPP are recognizably phenomenal. If not, their view just looks like a form of physicalism, according to which the rockbottom features of the world are non-qualitative.

Why RM is problematic: If everything is at bottom phenomenal,

how does this basic stratum serve to explain the non-qualitative strata?

Russellian Monists face an inversed explanatory gap

How should any of this work? Is this view even remotely plausible? Or would it just be convenient for Russellian Monists if it were true?

How, for example, is it that the intrinsic phenomenal properties of carbon atoms ground all its causal-dispositional powers?



PD has explanatory burdens to shoulder. Since they shouldn't take all phenomenal properties and psychophysical correlations

between such properties and physical properties to be brute fundamental facts, they need to posit a small set of properties and

correlations or laws that allow them to do the explaining.

I argued: a) property dualists cannot without tension hope that science will yield such an account (methodological argument),

and b) positing PPP to do the job leads to bridge-principle protophenomenalism or Russellian monism, both of which fail.

The dialectic: The questions that physicalism faces are real and serious. Should one cave and forfeit physicalism or stubbornly resist? I think that in this particular case

(physicalism versus dualism), stubbornness is a fine response.

Why?

Dualists face their own versions of the problems they think physicalists must solve. Since accepting dualism doesn't make our lives any easier, we may as well resist it.

Russellian Monism (RM) - the view:

Phenomenal minima don't sit *between* physical and

The world is phenomenal *all the way down*, there is *no gap* 

be no in principle problem to explain full-blooded



Naturalism is a version of this view. remember?



That's all Folks!

Open question for those who wonder: Must qi-Naturalism face Bennett's problem of the inversed explanatory

gap or should qi-Naturalists deem it a pseudo-problem?

Plausibly, these basic properties will not just be some ordinary phenomenal properties like what it's like to looks red, feel square, etc. For which ones could that be? intrinsic PPP underlie them.

JeeLoo Liu