Garrett, Don (2021). "Monism, Spinoza's Way," The Monist 104: 38-59. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onaa021

Don Garrett Last decade: $Monism =_{DEF}$ basic_{Schaffer} = **Existence Monism:** concrete_{Schaffer} = EM clashes with (EM) There is only one lots of interest metaphysically (MP) The one and i) not generated by, or only perception-based truisms in Monistic actual concrete object only basic actual fundamental, does not conceivable through, abstraction; [we see, after all, several [which is an improper part **Metaphysics** concrete object depend_{MP} on any ii) has spatial existence; iii) is things]. of itself]. is the cosmos. concrete object causally efficacious Question: Is Spinoza a cosmos_{Schaffer} = maximally actual Priority Monism (PM): Jonathan Object_{Schaffer} ≠ actual_{Schaffer} = forebear of concrete object of which all Schaffer exists really (not properties, qualities, basic such objects are proper parts. Fine, I'll try! contemporajust possibly). actual concrete objects are parts deities, spirits Only one sub-Here's my plan: ry monism? stance exists! P1: Substance = a) a metaphysi-3 arguments for monism: The mereological Monism I: summarize contemcally fundamental (=basic) and God! **Baruch Spinoza** sum/fusion implausibly P1: All fundamental metaphysical P1: As per our best physical theory, the porary monism integrated thing that b) evolves by the Schaffer sees the implies: No truths (T_{Mf}) are metaphysically cosmos is (possibly) an entangled system fundamental laws. cosmos as is not whole can necessary (= true in all possible II: intro & compare in which the quantum mechanical state of P2: The one and only thing that meets FWIW: I think basic; it must metaworlds). the whole is an emergent property and Spinoza's monism a) and b) is the cosmos. the theory of metaphysically physically P2: Either Monism or its denial is a T_{Mf}. not determined by the properties of its C: The cosmos is the one and only meaning depend on its depend on its III: Argue: Spinoza's C1: If Monism is metaphysically parts. substance. [= Spinozan Monism] Spinozism is these parts. (*LW*) parts. (*STB*) P2: Such a system is best understood as a view doesn't fully fit possible (= true in at least one world), it objectors opaque & idiobasic, metaphysically prior unit, i.e., as Schaffer's definition. is a T_{Mf}. provide is syncratic. Can't @P2: There could be several cowhat PM states the cosmos is. but has interesting P3: Monism is metaphysically possible: selftell w/o histoevolving metaphysically fundamental Other general arguments raised features. it is true in atomless gunk world. C: As per our best physical theory, PM is rical analysis. undermining against Schaffer's Monism: things that integrate into a whole. C2: Monism is a T_{f(M)} and, hence, true. true. @P2: Monism could be true only in CT1: God (= na-The contemporary A1 & A2 are fine, but the basic Spinoza's @P2: the best interpretation of our ..or pro ture) is the only concrete object could not have some worlds. monism: 3 physical theory may not require (Priority) conceivable sub-@P3: atomless gunk world doesn't with arguments core theses any (non-vague) concrete parts. Monism. stance. [Pantheism] CT3: Particular things are (limited & localized) affections Attributes = dimensions or domains of God is (thus) of God's attributes, modes by which God's attributes CT2: All of God's modes exist necessarily, and they existence infinite in the Some defini-An argument for are expressed in certain & definite ways as distinctive also exist eternally and infinitely exactly if they dimension of Spinoza thinks many such domains exist and tions: patterns of motion-and-rest in one extended substance follow from the nature of God's attributes. thought, of is (in this sense) an ontological pluralist. extension, etc. . substance: what is in God: an absolutely infinite attribute: what the mode: quality/property of a substance itself and such that its intellect perceives to be (expressed in the manner of some substance that consists of an P1: God, a substance consisting of God has an infinity of attributes and is The two known divine concept doesn't reconstituting the essence attribute), on which they depend both infinity of attributes, each of infinite attributes, each expressing infinite with respect to all of them. Also: attributes are quire any other concept ontologically (as their cause) and eternal and infinite essence, exists which expresses an eternal of a substance [i.e., that each of God's modes exists in every **Thought & Extension** from which it is formed. which makes it what it is]. conceptually/explanatorily. and infinite essence. necessarily. P2: In nature, there cannot be two or more substances of the same A3: Ability to exist is power, which correlates w/ degrees of reality. A2: Every (non-) existence needs a cause. As nothing could A1: Denying existence to God is absurd. Any possible substance's nature or attribute (since they'd be God must have maximum reality; no other substance is possible. possibly cause God's non-existence, God exists necessarily essence (& that of a being having all attributes) involves existence. indistinguishable). Arg for CT2 and CT3 Spinoza: My monism resolves various Crucial: Extension is one of God's infinite attributes. The infinite individual--the thing composed of all finite bodies—is an infinite mode pervading C1: Any second substance would short (pp. 44-5) God & expressing God's power. So are motion-and-rest, and the laws of nature that govern the evolution of all modes (including particular things) tensions in Descartes' mechanistic physics. have to share (impossibly) an attribute with God (against P2). B) Spinoza's one substance (= God) is not the Note: At times Schaffer says that fundamental things If 'actual concrete object' is A) Spinoza's God is actual, necessary. Spinoza vs. concrete. but not basic in Schaffer's cosmos in Schaffer's sense. Particular things are not don't depend on anything further. understood as 'concrete object No problem of universals (how sense, because Spinoza's God, while parts of God (God has no parts), but, rather, with the highest possible Spinoza's God is fundamental in this sense (it only can the same quality be instannot depending on anything else, expressions of (not identical with) the extended depends on itself). If basic objects can be selfdegree of reality', Spinoza can Monism tiated in multiple substances). depends on something: itself. substance, on which they metaphysically depend. count as an Existence Monist. grounding, Spinoza can count as Priority Monist. [S: There is just one substance!] Advantages General 1: Even if some of Spinoza's arguments (e.g., A1) General 2: Monism appears to be a better fit than dualism for our Positive advantages Supports a strong version of Helps explain the pervasive governing effiand his physics are now rejected, the move from MP (promising view vis-à-vis cacy of laws of nature & how they ground of Spinoza's the Principle of Sufficient best physical theories about how an apparent multitude of things can possibility to MP necessity of Monism remains appealing. evolve through causal interaction in accordance with one set of laws. vexed problems) Reason (just hinted at). the powers inhering in particular things. Helps explain possibilia in Helps explain the principles of when a **Negative advantages** While Schaffer may succumb to *STB*, While Schaffer may succumb to *LW*, LW rests on the idea that the cosmos, as the fusion of its parts, terms of the capacity of the plurality of things does / doesn't constitute Spinoza can dodge it. (avoids objections) Spinoza can dodge it. MP-depends on these parts. For S, God doesn't have parts. a whole. They do iff they communicate one substance to sustain particular things (with a motion to one another in a persisting *STB*: No particular thing (including any P1 & P2 For S. mental and physical states of distinctive formal essence) pattern. P1: If true, Monism is T_{Mf}. composite whole) could exist as things are integrated as being the same are fine, P2: For any two concrete objects x and y, if y MP-depends on x in some the only concrete object... it Offers a potentially Avoids paradoxical ontological vagueness. qualities existing in different attributes. P3 is not. possible world, it does so in every world in which both exist. would have to depend on God. attractive approach to the Any standing tendency to communicate P3: For any actual composite whole that doesn't depend on anything but For S, the minds of complex things relation between mind motion among elements as part of a There is only one possible world, so everything that co-exists its parts, in some possible world w that whole (& parts) is the cosmos.

with that whole does so necessarily. W, that is, does not exist.

In w, the cosmos MP-depends on its parts, is not basic, & Monism false.

are composed of the minds of their

parts, but also grounded in God.

and body: a distinctive

version of panpsychism.

persistent pattern constitutes an

individual; individuals can even overlap.